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The spillover effect of South Sudan in Gambella

By Dereje Feyissa

Refugee influx and ethnic conflicts

Gambella is one of the most conflict-ridden regions in Ethiopia. One of the most contentious issues is the politics of numbers that has locked two of the region’s major ethnic groups, the Anuak and the Nuer, into conflict[1]. Both have a cross-border settlement in South Sudan as well. Until the mid-1980s the Anuak constituted the majority of Gambella’s population. However, the massive influx of refugees since the outbreak of the second Sudanese civil war in 1983 has dramatically changed the region’s demography[2].

The Nuer have a larger presence in South Sudan than Ethiopia and represent the majority of the refugees coming to Gambella—a process, facilitated by the cross-border settlement pattern and clan networks. By 1994 they had already become the majority constituting 40% of Gambella’s population, a demographic trend which has continued to grow, as the latest census in 2007 indicates. The Anuak, who advance a historical argument for political entitlement over the Gambella region, contest the census, arguing that most of the Nuer in Gambella are not Ethiopian citizens.

These competing narratives of political entitlement—historical and demographic—have been one of the drivers of conflict in the Gambella region, especially after the establishment of the Gambella regional state as one of the constitutive units of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia since 1995. In Ethiopia’s federal system, regional administrative power is allocated in direct proportion to the population of the country’s ethno-cultural communities. The relative numerical superiority of a certain ethno-cultural community would, therefore, entitle it to more seats in regional and national parliament than the other.

The ongoing civil war has already produced hundreds of thousands of refugees, mostly hosted in refugee camps in Gambella. By mid-September 2014, the number of South Sudanese refugees in Gambella rose to 190,000[3], predominantly ethnic Nuer. The Ethiopian government is hosting the refugees with assistance from international organizations. However, the new refugee phenomenon in Gambella is viewed only from a humanitarian point of view, whilst it may have longer-term political ramifications for the area.

For decades the Anuak have felt marginalized by the influx of Nuer refugees into the Gambella region, a demographic anxiety compounded by massive migration of highlanders from the east. The current Nuer movement may renew tensions if Anuak believe they are here to stay, further altering the area’s demographics in their rival’s favour. The Anuak believe themselves to be the main indigenous group but the continued influx of Nuer refugees affects the power balance. Anecdotal evidence shows that some Nuer political elites are using the refugees to gain political advantage, by issuing Ethiopian ID cards to Nuer refugees, causing tension between the regional political leadership and the federal institution of the Administration for Refugee Affairs[4].

Anuak political organizations have also already politicized the refugee influx. In its press release, for instance, the diaspora-based Gambella Nilotes United Movement (GNUM/A) has called for a halt to what it calls “resettling refugees throughout the Gambella Region” without the will of the local communities [5]. It further noted, “The spread of the refugees’ camps in the Anuak land is nothing else than ethnic cleansing
to serve the EPRDF [Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front] government’s interest in the region”. What appears a humanitarian act of the Ethiopian government is thus represented as a conspiratorial scheme, fuelling the already existing tension not only between the Anuak and the Nuer but also between the Anuak political organizations and the Ethiopian government.

**Competition over natural resources**

Although Gambella has one of the lowest population densities in Ethiopia, there is however a growing pressure on the land, particularly the fertile but limited riverine land that supports flood-retreat farming for the Anuak and provides pastureland for grazing for the Nuer during the dry season. This riverine land is contested not only at the inter-ethnic level but also intra-ethnically, and the various Nuer clans have frequently fought to access the water points. The protracted conflict between the Jikany and Lou Nuer and the violent conflicts among the various Gaajak clans are cases in point. The leasing of hundreds of thousands of hectares of land for foreign companies with the advent of large-scale commercial agriculture in the region has further created land scarcity.

The refugees might, as was the case in previous times, seek to access the contested land, further fuelling the resource-based conflict. The problem might be compounded as the Nuer tend to aggregate into groups (clans, sub-clans, sub, sub clans etc.).

**Unintended consequences of humanitarian support**

The sense of exclusion and relative deprivation of local communities generated by provision of basic services to refugees is one of the major drivers of tension and conflict between refugees and host communities. This is so mainly because refugee camps are often established in the border areas that constitute the most marginal spaces, such as Gambella, in the provision of basic services by their respective governments. With some exceptions, the focus of the humanitarian support has been on the refugees without paying attention to the host community[6].

**Public health risks**

As the political crisis in South Sudan continues, the physical condition of arriving refugees is deteriorating and the prevalence of malnutrition is alarmingly high. There are also huge issues with measles. Outbreaks of the disease in South Sudan have been reported, and 60-70 cases were documented across the border in Ethiopia[7].

The Ethiopian government, in partnership with the various international organizations, is supporting a mass immunization campaign but there is still fear of a possible epidemic. At a time when the world is grappling with new global epidemics such as Ebola, there is a need to monitor and control potential public health risks emanating from the refugee camps.

**Gambella’s significance for South Sudan**

Cross-border political and military mobilisation has been a hallmark of regional politics that binds Gambella closely to South Sudan. Like the 1991 split of the SPLA, the on-going violent conflict has also been increasingly framed in ethnic terms, with Kiir and Machar claiming to represent or identified with the two major ethnic groups of South Sudan, the Dinka and the Nuer, respectively. The conflict quickly spread and became deeply polarized as civilians were targeted based on their ethnicities. People in Gambella are furious with President Salva Kiir for the killings of Nuer in Juba, while many have relatives now sheltering in the UN’s compounds in South Sudan. The SPLM in opposition led by Riek Machar has extensive support among the Nuer populace in Gambella. The Ethiopian government, on the other hand, has followed an official policy of neutrality and assumed a mediating role; a position that is reinforced
by its current IGAD leadership.

Regional political actors in Gambella, especially among the Nuer populace and leadership who explicitly show solidarity with Machar’s “Nuer faction”, do not necessarily share Addis Ababa’s policy of neutrality. The Nuer have occupied the crucial office of the regional presidency since 2012; an office hitherto considered as the ‘reserve’ of the Anuak. Apart from facilitating the influx of Nuer refugees through the porous border, the Gambella regional state reportedly hosted prominent political figures in South Sudan at the height of the conflict in March 2014. Some Nuer members of the Regional Special Force are also said to have joined Machar’s army with the consent, or at least complacency of some members of the Nuer political leadership in the Gambella Regional State. Still, many Nuer prophets from Gambella have joined Machar to augment his ‘spiritual capability’ in his deadly confrontation with his rival, who has also done the same much in line with South Sudanese political culture within which prophetic tradition plays a crucial role.

Apparent, this gives the impression that Ethiopia has two ‘foreign policies’ towards South Sudan; one federal and the other regional, or what Kincaid (2010) calls a ‘constituent diplomacy’, international activities of a sub-national government within a federation. It remains to be seen whether this constituent diplomacy catalyses a possible change in Addis Ababa’s official policy of neutrality in the context of the increasing regionalisation of the conflict in South Sudan; further creating a diplomatic space for local political actors to influence Ethiopia’s foreign policy making. Asmara has already gone too far accusing Addis Ababa of “actively supporting” the Machar faction, albeit without providing a credible evidence, except for a reference to Ethiopia’s criticism of Uganda’s military intervention supporting Salva Kiir and the greater political representation of the Nuer in Gambella.

Addis Ababa, on its part, accuses Asmara for siding with the Machar faction as part of its regional destabilisation efforts. Both allegations at least indicate the possibility of South Sudan as the new arena for the wider proxy war between Addis Ababa and Asmara within which Gambella plays a strategic role. At stake is Ethiopia’s image as an “impartial mediator” between the two factions and even between Juba and Khartoum.

**Some recommendations**

Humanitarian interventions need to be pursued in a conflict sensitive manner, such as a more regulated refugee influx and move towards a more harmonious refugees-host community relationship. As the discussion in the previous sections reveals humanitarian interventions in Gambella need to be situated within the broader historical and current political context in order to avoid refugees’ related conflicts affecting regional politics like in the previous periods. With that spirit the following recommendations are put forward:

- **Cost-sharing:** Gambella has disproportionately borne the brunt of hosting South Sudanese refugees. To alleviate the demographic pressure in Gambella, which has created a potential for rekindling inter-ethnic and intra-ethnic conflicts, the refugees need to be fairly distributed within Ethiopia, particularly in regions that share border with South Sudan such as Benishangul-Gumuz and SNNPR (Southern Nations, Nationalities and People’s Region). Cost sharing should also be evenly distributed among the IGAD countries. Of course, the Nuer might not feel comfortable going to Uganda given the latter’s military intervention supporting the South Sudanese government. But countries such as Kenya and the Sudan could and should share the burden of hosting the refugees in the spirit of regional solidarity.

- **Humanitarian intervention in a conflict sensitive manner should also**
 include an integrated intervention supporting not only the refugees but also the local communities near the refugee camps. This helps avoid a sense of relative deprivation of local communities.

- The Ethiopian government, though commendable in its humanitarian act as it were, should also to pay attention to how it is locally perceived and its unintended consequences. The emerging conspiratorial narrative about its role fuels conflict and undermines state legitimacy in an already fragile region such as Gambella. Humanitarian action, whether by international organisations or the regional government, should not impinge on the contentious issue of citizenship.

- The Ethiopian government needs to articulate a more coherent policy of neutrality towards South Sudan, constructively engaging Gambella’s regional political leadership. As it stands, the incongruence between what appears to be a constituent diplomacy and Ethiopia’s foreign policy could subvert the country’s regional peace making capacity ultimately undermining IGAD’s mediating efforts. The incongruence might also reinforce the regionalisation of South Sudan’s conflict, the signs of which are already discernible.

Dereje Feyissa is Africa Research Director at International Law and Policy Institute, Oslo, Norway. He can be reached at derejefdori2011@googlemail.com


[4] The tension escalated in April 2014 when the regional leadership dismissed one of the ARA officials from his position on the controversy surrounding the issuance of Ethiopian ID cards to the refugees.


[6] For instance, UNICEF has identified the burden on the local services at an early stage and decided to increase the number of shallow wells in the area in order to create a balance between the host community and refugees. See http://www.unicef.org/esaro/5440_ethiopia2014_water-for-refugees.html


[8] Machar’s claim for a divine mandate in his bid for political power ostensibly refers to the prophecy of Ngundeng, the greatest of Nuer prophets of the 19th century.


KENYA

Reasons for radicalisation

Summarized by Najum Mushtaq

Moved by a Somali mother’s puzzling dilemma as to why one of her sons went on to join al-Shabab but the other became a police officer, Dr Anneli Botha of the Institute of Strategic Studies, Pretoria, has done extensive—yet by no means exhaustive—research across east Africa to find empirical answers to the question. The former police officer from South Africa, who self-financed the Kenya leg of her PhD project (which also covers the Finn Church Aid-funded Somalia component and research in other east African countries), presented her work at the ISS’s Nairobi office on 15 October at a heavily attended seminar.

For her quite thorough and remarkable doctoral study of why people in Kenya join groups like al-Shabab and the Mombasa Republican Council (MRC), Dr Botha interviewed 95 individuals associated with al-Shabab, 45 with the MRC, and 46 relatives of individuals who had either been arrested or investigated or killed for association with al-Shabab or five relatives of Mombassa Republican Council (MRC) members—all of them Kenyans of Somali ethnicity. The comprehensive range and scope of the questions asked approach the problem from as diverse angles as emotional reasons, such as fear and anger for signing up, to educational levels of the conscripts to these groups. The study report also looks into the role of family, ideology and identity—who is ‘us’ and who’s the ‘enemy’—as well religious socialisation and socio-economic drivers of recruitment to these groups.

All this work has led Botha to reach an ominous conclusion:

Muslim youth have joined extremist groups as a counter-reaction to what they see as government-imposed “collective punishment” driven by the misguided perception that all Somali and Kenyan-Somali nationals are potential terrorists. As long as Kenyan citizens exclusively identify with an ethnic/religious identity that is perceived to be under threat, radicalisation will increase.

One of the many instructive findings presented by Dr Botha underlines the weak sense of Kenyan national identity or citizenship among those who are—or may once have been—associated with the two groups generally seen as the twin threat of Islamic radicalism to Kenya’s national security. She went to great lengths to make the point that al-Shabab and the MRC are two different phenomena with different agenda, characteristics and profiles.

“Although the MRC is often mistakenly associated with al-Shabaab...there are very clear differences in the type of individuals who join al-Shabaab and the MRC and their reasons for doing so,“ said Dr Botha. Some other differences in the profile of recruits—such as 67 MRC members only attended primary education while 45% of al-Shabab had secondary education—also explain the different nature and agenda of the organisations—MRC’s local, secessionist objectives versus al-Shabab’s global ideological network. Still, they share an almost absolute lack of allegiance to the Kenyan national identity and, in equal measure, a lack of faith and trust in the ruling political classes.

A strong perception of physical threat as well as the notion that their “religion is under threat” by an array of enemies—especially the government of Kenya and other rival religions—also figures prominently among the several factors that interviewees from both groups cited as reasons for their actions.
The reports notes that “despite the fact that the two organisations, influenced by different histories, contest different areas (the MRC focuses on land issues and is a secessionist movement while al-Shabaab stresses Islamist extremism), the question is whether they tap into the same frustrations and grievances.”

**Religion, ethnicity and inequality**

A key element of this complex picture that distinguishes MRC from al-Shabab is the leaning of their members towards religious and ethnic identities: a predominantly ethnic, geographical coastal identity for the former while a stronger sense of religious identity in al-Shabab’s case. “A convergence of religious and ethnic identity provided a bridge between al-Shabab and the MRC, especially in the coastal and north-eastern regions,” observes Dr Botha as she notes that this convergence is not new and did not start with Kenya’s decision to send its forces into Somalia in 2011 but goes back many decades to the Shifting war of the 1960s.

“It is apparent that Kenyans are extremely divided. While diversity can be celebrated when mutual respect exists, it can also destroy a country from within when there is not trust with reference to both religious and ethnic differences, as described by al-Shabab and MRC respondents,” concludes the report.

The report also clarifies the oft-cited linkage between economic poverty and violent extremism by observing that “it was not poverty that drove respondents to the MRC, but rather evidence of inequality based on ethnicity and geographical location.”

“When access is on based ethnic, cultural or religious differences between the ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’, economic conditions can contribute to radicalisation and instability,” says the report.

Even though, observes Dr Botha, the majority of both al-Shabab and MRC respondents attended public schools, the level of integration and contact with individuals from different ethnic and religious background needs attention.

Botha believes that tackling the problem of radicalisation requires “the entire Kenyan government to initiate dedicated strategies to build national identity.”

**Crime and terrorism**

The report is particularly critical of Kenya’s counterterrorism measures and policing methods. The number of convictions, not arrests, is the real indicator of performance, remarked Br Botha, who emphasised the harm done to the Kenyan society by mass, indiscriminate and arbitrary arrests in the wake of acts of terrorism.

Responses to terrorist attacks, Botha emphasised, should be intelligence-led and targeted, and not random or based on profiling of ethnic or religious groups. Such measures will only increase the incidence of radicalisation as fear and anger among more youth and families rise.

Arrest the criminals who perpetrate these attacks, identify those who plan and finance these attacks, says Botha, and have them convicted for their crimes. These policing failures to properly investigate and resolve crimes result in the kind of responses that have been seen in Kenya, with hundreds and thousands Somalis rounded up indiscriminately and confined to a stadium in Nairobi.

“Of even more concern are claims of extrajudicial killings of problematic individuals, most notably Muslim scholars,” says the study as it states that such perceptions has radicalised and recruited dozens, if not hundreds, to the ranks of extremist organisations.
The report recommends that an 'effective counterterrorism policy and strategy should appreciate the broader context in which violent actions or attacks occur and seek to meaningfully and nonviolently attend to the problems thrown up by the context'.

Summarised by Najum Mushtaq


REGIONAL PERSPECTIVES

Wither AU’s counterterrorism policy?

By Parselelo Kantai

On 2 September, as the African Union’s Peace and Security Commission had gathered the continent’s heads of state in Nairobi for a summit on terrorism, a US government drone over the Somali port city of Barawe struck a convoy of senior al-Shabab leaders. Among those killed was Ahmed Ali Godane, al-Shabab’s central leader.

Godane’s killing, confirmed a few days later by the White House, ranks among one of the most important hits in the American war against terror. The killing of Godane, in fact, resembled in several ways the May 2011 killing of Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad, in western Pakistan. Both operations took years of surveillance and infiltration into the target’s networks. In bin Laden’s case, the Americans planned the final assault with an elite force that carried out the attack as President Obama and his military high command watched via a satellite link from the White House. While the details of the final assault in the Godane killing are sketchy, the White House reported that it had taken ‘years of painstaking work by our intelligence, military and law enforcement professionals’.[1]

Significantly, in both cases, the value of a targeted, ‘high-value’ killing far outweighed the awkward diplomatic consequences of a unilateral action taken without the knowledge of the host country—in Bin Laden’s case, as also in Godane’s, the apparent lack of warning to either the Somali government or the region’s governments that have deployed thousands of troops in Somalia for the past six years.

And this was a hit for which the Americans would take exclusive credit—ironically, as African leaders gathered in Nairobi to discuss terrorism.

Whose war?

It is this incongruence, this unequal fit of agendas, priorities, intelligence, technologies and finances in the fight against terrorism on African soil that presents the biggest conundrum for the African Union and for individual African governments.

Since the 1970s when terrorism, once called ‘the weapon of the weak’, became the instrument for marginal far-left groups in the West and of liberation movements such as the Palestinian Liberation Organisation waging war against the US-backed Israeli state, Africa has offered a theatre of soft targets and proxy campaigns. And even when Uganda’s Idi Amin gave refuge to Palestinian hijackers at Entebbe airport in 1976, there was no doubting that one of Africa’s ‘Big Men’ was merely posturing in other people’s wars.
Clearly, this is no longer the case as global militant outfits have set up or co-opted branches in Africa. Boko Haram’s terrorist campaigns in Nigeria have killed over 10,000 Africans in Nigeria this year alone.[2] Al-Shabab has grown into a regional phenomenon and challenges national governments throughout the Horn of Africa. In keeping with the blitzkrieg of strategic alterations offered by the emergence of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, jihadist groups in Nigeria and elsewhere in West Africa now prefer military occupation and long-term control, rather than the cocktail of suicide bombings, school-girl abductions and ransom-kidnappings, as the more inspired ideological option.

In other words, we are now entering an age where terrorism is rapidly morphing into full scale asymmetrical warfare pitting small mobile units that are the nodal points of a globalized ideological force against conventional national African armies hamstrung by distant bureaucracies, daily cash, fuel and other shortages on the frontline and a creeping sense among the rank and file of every man for himself. And the prize is territory and hostage populations.

A series of letters dating from mid-2012 between two Al Qaeda senior officials and published recently by the New York Times, apparently to expose the importance of kidnappings to Al-Qaeda’s operations, inadvertently revealed the scale of the insurgents’ political agenda—not only to terrorise but also to convert encountered populations and occupy territory.[3]

**Need for an African response**

Even though much of the military response to the problem comes either directly from US and Western forces, or is sponsored and orchestrated by them, ‘terrorism’ is no longer their problem. If it wasn’t before, the war on jihadist insurgents is very much our African crisis. If not confronted, it could very well precipitate the winding up of the post-colonial states and force a redrawing of the continent’s post-colonial order with the emergence of new polities that tap into the deep undercurrents of perceived religious and ethnic grievances, political marginalization and youth disenfranchisement.

Mali may have been ‘rescued’ from the brink—and who would have considered the troubling prospect of French interventionism there even a decade ago?—but across Africa with its weak borders, even weaker states, unaccountable republican elites and secessionist movements, the threat could just be an urban informal settlement away, as the case of terror attacksNairobi illustrates.

If terrorism, or perhaps more precisely, the rise of a global jihadist insurgency has opened another, sadly familiar installment in the crisis of hurried state formation in Africa, the language of the response at the centre has remained wonderfully externalized. *It’s their problem, not our crisis.*

In Nairobi last year, for example, state officials were keen to position the Westgate attack within the general context of global jihad for which Western assistance was urgently needed. Instead of African countries taking ownership of the strategy to counter the threat of terrorism, there is still heavy reliance on—and uncritical allegiance to—the Western, US-led militaristic agenda.[4]

The reluctance to design an autonomous counterterrorism policy, specific to national and regional context in Africa, has been a running theme in security thinking at least since the US Embassy bombings in 1998. Financed, outfitted and often merely playing an auxiliary role, Nairobi has been comfortable allowing US government security agencies to define the problem and design the response. In this scheme of things, where Kenya plays host for over a decade to foreign security agents who are free to run a counter-insurgency script of their own making, it is Nairobi that is left to deal with the political cost.
One of the consequences of this specific case has been the deep fissures that have developed between upcountry power elites and the Muslim population at the coast. Fears of radicalization, in no small part fuelled by a brutal US-cum-Government of Kenya counter-insurgency campaign, have created a positive feedback loop in which state security swoops on neighbourhoods, arbitrary arrests and state-sponsored assassinations of prominent Muslim leaders only serve to deepen the sense of historical marginalization within the population. In turn, these measures fuel the radicalization of young people and, quite predictably sweep many of them into nascent and established jihadist groups. It’s the self-fulfilling prophecy of a never-ending conflict generated by fear, ignorance and not a small amount of racism.

The key element in all this has been the US government’s counter-terrorism strategy. Launched in 2003 by the Bush administration, the then $100 million counterterrorism programme identified the growing jihadist threat in Africa, identified ‘ungoverned spaces’ as potential recruitment and training sites and sought to enlist African governments’ support to combat the threat.

The case of Somalia

It was this set of policies that instigated in 2006 the war in Somalia against the Islamic Courts Union. Fought with Ethiopian ‘boots-on-the-ground’, it resulted in the dismantling of the ICU, which for all its drawbacks, had offered the beleaguered country the most viable opportunity for stability since the fall of Siad Barre in 1991. Again, rather than an AU response, the Ethiopian invasion was widely seen to have occurred at the behest of the United States.

The rise of the ICU had presented a difficult conundrum: could the region, and the world, live with a stable Somalia under jihadist rule? With nobody waiting for an answer, militarizing the solution created a whole new set of problems that have paradoxically, accelerated the arrival of the very jihadist threat that was being averted.

There is no doubt that al-Shabab’s insurgency rose from the restless ghosts of the ICU. To combat this threat, more US government money was thrown at the problem with the kitty swelled by other members, mostly Western, of the international community, and promptly taken up by many actors in the region, keen to intervene militarily for both legitimate security concerns and other, more pragmatic reasons.

Six years on, it is pragmatism that has driven policy rather than the other way around. Individual country enthusiasm to join AMISOM—there was virtually none at the beginning; there are now over 17,000 troops in Somalia drawn from six African countries—has quite decidedly been predicated on available budgets rather than legitimate threats. (And if there is any dispute about this, one simply has to ask the question: where would AMISOM be, if the funding were withdrawn?). To make the point, a quick example: in Kampala in 2011, a senior media advisor to President Museveni disclosed that, along with the anticipated $2 billion revenues from oil, Uganda expected to raise another $3 billion in donor aid if it could become the region’s peace and security hub. Such are the calculations in play in the race for Western counter-terrorism monies.[5]

Nonetheless, 22 years since the onset of the Somalia crisis, are we any closer to a lasting solution? The military approach, along with diplomatic patchwork to stitch up a government in Mogadishu that still cannot exert itself over most parts of Somalia, is an external solution. It is not viable precisely because it is lifted out of a counterterrorism handbook that, over the past decade at the very least, has merely served to complicate the original crisis—Afghanistan and Iraq are two festering cases.

Moreover, with emerging reports of massive oil finds in Somalia several Western
governments are keen to either revive oil concessions or obtain new ones.[6] And with powerful Islamist elements already in control of government in Mogadishu and financed mostly by donors in the Middle East; with several governments interested in financing the modernization of the country’s ports along a 3,600-km coastline, the prospect of a scramble for the broken soul of the country suggests, worryingly, an escalation of the crisis rather than the much-touted return to stability.

**Time for AU to lead**

In the last ten years, the Peace and Security Council of the AU has focused on the agenda of terrorism only in five of its meetings. Individual governments as well as the AU seem content to play a secondary role to Western militaries and donors and have failed to find local, more political solutions to the challenge of Islamic militancy spreading across Africa. The AU needs to acknowledge that the global jihadist insurgency is now very much Africa’s problem. *It is ours.* But, like so much on this continent, Africans themselves have overlooked the full dimensions of the threat.

‘Terrorism’ poses an existential question to the continent. Responding to it indeed may inevitably require a military component, but the AU needs to adopt a more comprehensive context-specific approach and take ownership of the process to combat this most serious threat to peace and security in modern history. As experience in other countries around the Muslim world shows, extremism cannot be defeated through military might alone.

Above and beyond all else, AU states require a re-examination of the fundamental domestic political arrangements that have opened the gates to the jihadists in the first place. The main source of the jihadist threat in the Horn emanates from Somalia, which has now spread into areas across the borders. The weakness of the security and governance apparatus, as well as the socio-political conditions that push marginalised communities into the hands of extremists, could only be addressed by African states themselves.

**Parselelo Kantai** is the East and Horn of Africa editor of *The Africa Report*. He also writes for *Africa Confidential* and the *Financial Times*. He has been a Reuters Fellow and can be reached at olekantai@yahoo.com

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[5] Interview with the writer in Kampala, 2011.

UN monitors allege Eritrea supporting “regional armed groups”

In its October 2014 report to the Security Council the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea concludes:

Eritrean support for regional armed groups continues to be linked primarily to the larger context of Ethiopian-Eritrean rivalry in the Horn of Africa, the unsettled border dispute between Ethiopia and Eritrea, and the way in which that rivalry shapes Eritrean foreign policy. The Monitoring Group obtained testimonials and evidence that Eritrea continues to support armed opposition groups from neighbouring countries, notably the Somalia-based Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), the Tigray People’s Democratic Movement (TPDM), and Ginbot Sebat. The scale and pattern of Eritrea’s support for these regional armed groups is not uniform and it differs from one group to the other.

Read the report here

A damning report by the UN Monitoring Group

In October the UN Security Council’s Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group—essentially to monitor violations of the arms embargo and other threats to peace and security—released its latest report which, among other reporting, levels serious charges of financial misappropriation against some officials of the Somali Federal Government and accuses them of helping Islamic militants. The report also alleges that arms meant for the Somali government were found to be on sale in the open market. Although the Somali Federal Government and the individuals named in the report have rejected the allegations, the monitoring group’s report has once again raised questions about the accountability of international assistance to the country and calls for investigation into these alleged cases of corruption and collaboration with the militants. The report can be accessed at http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2014/726
HRW Allegations: AMISOM probes cases of sexual abuse by soldiers in Somalia

In September Human Right Watch released a detailed report documenting the sexual exploitation and abuse of Somali women and girls on two AMISOM bases in Somalia’s capital, Mogadishu, since 2013.

The report titled “The Power these Men Have Over Us – Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by African Union Forces in Somalia” states: “The AU soldiers, relying on Somali intermediaries, have used a range of tactics, including humanitarian aid, to coerce vulnerable women and girls into sexual activity. They have also raped or otherwise sexually assaulted women who were seeking medical assistance or water at AMISOM bases.

Based on interviews with 21 women and girls, who described being raped or sexually exploited by Ugandan or Burundian military personnel serving with the AU forces, the report has drawn immediate reaction from the AU.

The Chairperson of the Commission of the African Union, Dr Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, was quick to respond to the report and authorized the deployment of an Investigation Team to look into allegations“ which was issued in Nairobi, Kenya on 8 September, 2014.

The HRW report is available here http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/somalia0914_ForUpload.pdf


State and services in South Sudan
“Livelihoods, access to services and perceptions of governance: An analysis of Pibor county, South Sudan from the perspective of displaced people” Working paper 23, Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium, Feinstein International Center, September 2014.

This research paper addresses three questions:

How do people’s perceptions, expectations and experiences of the state in conflict-affected situations affect state legitimacy, state ability to provide social protection and services, and under what circumstances does this lead to state-building?

How do international actors interact with the state and attempt to build the capacity of state institutions to deliver social protection and basic services?

What do livelihood trajectories in fragile and conflict-affected situations tell us about how governments and aid agencies can more effectively support people to make a secure living?


People on the move: Leaving the Horn on a boat

“Going West: contemporary mixed migration trends from the Horn of Africa to Libya & Europe”, is a report from the Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat, Nairobi, published in June 2014.

Desperate youth and despondent families willing to put life at risk to escape from the Horn of Africa is well documented phenomenon. This report contributes to a growing body of evidence highlighting the importance of the westward route of mixed migration from the Horn of Africa to Libya and Europe.

“The westward flow of migrants appears to be increasing rapidly but the route is characterised by great risk at different stages of the journey. The findings of this study as well as other research cited illustrate the range of risks migrants face when on the move; from robbery, neglect in remote locations, brutal extortion to outright murder and negligent loss of life.”
The report maps the dynamic and changing nature of smuggler/migrant routes being used in the Horn of Africa and Yemen region, with especial focus on Eritreans, Ethiopians and Somalis on the move. In particular this report responds to the sense that the ‘westward’ direction is increasingly being used by smuggled migrants who find themselves thwarted when trying to use alternative (and previously extensively used) routes that take them east (Yemen to Saudi Arabia) and north (through Egypt into Israel).

*The report can be accessed at [http://www.regionalmms.org/fileadmin/content/rmms_publications/Going_West_migration_trends_Libya_Europe_RMMS.pdf](http://www.regionalmms.org/fileadmin/content/rmms_publications/Going_West_migration_trends_Libya_Europe_RMMS.pdf)*